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If  local  public  goods  exhibit  spillovers  and  regions  are  sufficiently  symmetric, 
decentralization  implies  underprovision,  whereas  cooperative  centralization  is 
associated  with  strict  Pareto-improvement.  This  classic  inference  rests  on  two 
assumptions: local politicians are delegated sincerely and never provide voluntary 
transfers to the other regions. We abandon these assumptions in a setup of two 
symmetric regions with imperfect complementarity between local public goods. For 
this particular aggregation, non-cooperative decentralization can achieve the social 
optimum, whereas cooperative centralization cannot.  
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Recent explosion of political  economy sheds new light on the classic tradeoffs in public 
economics,  such  as  the  one  between  benefits  and  costs  of  decentralization.  In  the  first 
generation of fiscal federalism, decentralization was perceived only as a safeguard against 
uniform (one-size-fits-all) policies for asymmetric regions. In the second generation of fiscal 
federalism  (Oates,  2005),  decentralization  wins  endorsement  especially  by  political 
economists. Among others, Persson and Tabellini (2000, p. 325-39) argue that cooperative 
centralization may exacerbate the effects of domestic incentive constraints, for example in the 
case  of  dynamic  inconsistency  in  capital  taxation.  Wilson  and  Janeba  (2003)  show  that 
decentralization allows for a more optimal mix of vertical and horizontal externalities under 
tax competition; Hindriks and Lockwood (2005) point to the higher accountability of the 
governments. Particularly in the European Union, trade-offs associated with centralization are 
increasingly more studied since the current assignment of tasks in multilevel EU-governance 
is contested both in theory and policy (see, e.g., Alesina et al., 2005).  
We  aim  to  contribute  to  this literature  by a  theoretical analysis of  the  case of  imperfect 
complementarity. This particular aggregation occurs when one local good is complementary 
with another local good, but only imperfectly. For illustration of this aggregation, consider a 
stylized example of two terrorist groups, e.g. ETA and IRA. Suppose IRA is interested only in 
attacks in the U.K., and ETA in attacks in Spain; we call IRA ‘domestic terrorists’ in the U.K. 
and ‘foreign terrorists’ in Spain, and vice versa. Let both terrorist groups be perfectly mobile 
across the two countries, and assume that they can organize their activities from any country, 
if necessary. The countries spend  1 g , respectively  2 g , on non-rival domestic antiterrorist 
measures.  Non-rival  antiterrorist  spending  covers,  for  example,  monitoring  of  suspicious 
financial  flows.  Because  of  local  knowledge,  the  spending  has  efficiency  one  if  applied 
towards domestic terrorists and κ  < 1 if applied towards foreign terrorists. Rational terrorists 
select the country with the lowest effective amount of antiterrorist spending and the effective 
levels of protection are  1 1 2 min( , ) G g g κ =  and  2 2 1 min( , ) G g g κ = . 
Although  complementary  or  Leontief-type  aggregation  may  be  regarded  as  too  extreme   2
(Cornes, 1993), it has rationale for situations when regions eliminate adversaries, or if the 
output depends on the least amount of inputs due to certain physical characteristics. In the 
former case, for example, rational terrorists tend to attack the least protected airline (Heal and 
Kuhnreuther, 2005); in the latter case, the level of protection against flood hinges on the level 
of  the  lowest  dike  (Hirshleifer,  1983). Extensive discussion on  applicability  of imperfect 
complementarity (specifically on the source of the imperfection) follows in Section 5. 
We apply imperfect complementarity on the strategic situation of two regions, each producing 
one local input. The local inputs are complements into the production of local outputs; the 
domestic  input  enters  perfectly  and  the  foreign  input  enters  imperfectly.  We  adjust  the 
seminal setup by Besley and Coate (2003), by two modifications, complementary aggregation 
(instead of substitutes) and voluntary transfers. This allows comparison with their main result: 
in Besley and Coate (2003), cooperative centralization produces a higher level of public good 
surplus if spillovers exceed a critical level. For our particular aggregation, this tradeoff is 
different;  cooperative  centralization  never  attains  the  social  optimum,  whereas  non-
cooperative decentralization does, in some specifications even for all levels of spillovers. 
We assume a two-stage game of voters grouped in two regions and two delegates, one per 
region. In Stage 1, voters in each region simultaneously elect their policy-seeking delegate. In 
Stage  2,  the  delegates  simultaneously  decide  on  the  production  of  local  inputs.  We  will 
specifically focus on the willingness to cover costs of the production of the local input in the 
other region (voluntary transfers). In the electoral game of voters, we will further examine 
incentives to strategic elect or delegate; we will concentrate on whether voting for a less 
interested  representative  will  extract  voluntary transfers  from a  relatively more interested 
representative from the other region. For this purpose we disregard any exogenously given 
heterogeneity by considering fully symmetric regions. 
Strategic delegation is a phenomenon with long history in economics (Crawford and Varian, 
1979),  having  been  applied  in  monetary  economics  (Rogoff,  1995;  Chari  et  al.,  2004), 
industrial  organization  (Aghion  and  Tirole,  1997),  tax  competition  (Brueckner,  2004)  or 
environmental economics (Buchholz et al., 2005). Incentives for strategic delegation emerge 
especially  when  delegates  are  expected  to  bargain.  Conservative  delegation  is  used  to 
strategically decrease the breakdown allocation, and induce relatively larger compensations 
(Segendorff, 1998). In contrast, progressive delegation gives advantage in the case of fixed 
cost-sharing rules (Besley and Coate, 2003). Dur and Roelfsema (2005) point that the cost-
sharing  rule  is  the  key:  the  larger  non-shareable  costs,  the  larger  incentive  to  delegate 
conservatively and vice versa, both in decentralization and centralization. In our setup with 
the  fixed cost-sharing rule,  we will observe  that  other  aspects  (possibility of transfers or 
specification of marginal rate of substitution) play also a key role.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model, and solves 
for the social optimum serving as the benchmark for normative analysis. Section 3 solves for 
equilibria in decentralization with and without transfers. It derives the sufficient condition for   3
decentralization with transfers to deliver the social optimum. Section 4 examines cooperative 
centralization, and proves that cooperative centralization never attains the social optimum. 
Combined together, we derive the sufficient condition for cooperative centralization to be 
Pareto-inferior  to  non-cooperative  decentralization.  Section  5  motivates  imperfect 




Our model closely follows the framework by Besley and Coate (2003). The main difference is 
that a local public good and a ‘spillover’ from the other local public good are not substitutes, 
but complements. Motivation for this extension has been provided already by Besley and 
Coate,  who  anticipated  that  their  main  result  may  not  be  robust  to  different  aggregation 
(Besley and Coate, 2003, fn. 15). The extension is interesting since complementarity requires 
the setup to be substantially reinterpreted: instead of local public goods, we speak of local 
inputs, and instead of imperfect spillovers, we assume imperfect access to the other local 
input (more on interpretation follows in Section 5). 
Assume two regions of equal size,  1,2 i = . In each region, there is a continuum of voters  j  
differing only in preferences for public goods,  [0, ]
j
i λ λ ∈ , distributed by  1 1 ( ) F λ  and  2 2 ( ) F λ . 
Like Besley and Coate (2003), suppose that mean and median values are identical, and the 
same in the two regions:  1
1 2 2 ( ) ( )
m m F F λ λ = =  and  1 2 ( ) ( )
m E E λ λ λ = = .
1 
Each region produces a local input. The local input is also available in the other region, but 
only in share κ , where 0 1 κ < < . The local input in region  { } 1,2 i∈  is financed either by the 
region itself (at amount  i g ), or subsidized by the other region, at amount  i s− . Total amount of 
the  local  input  is  i i i x g s− = + .  Imperfectly  complementary  aggregation  implies  that  the 
amount  of  the  local  output  in  region  i  is  { } min( , ) min , ( ) i i i i i i i G x x g s g s κ κ − − − ≡ = + + .  If 
voluntary transfers are not feasible, then  1 2 0 s s = = . 
Production of inputs is financed through non-distortionary lump-sum taxes,  i t . A unit of any 
                                                
1  Besley  and  Coate  (2003) impose  that  distributions  must be symmetric and  identical. This  is unnecessarily 
restrictive since the purpose of these restrictions is only to get that a median (median-type) politician maximizes 
welfare of her region. In other words, the aim is to assume away any difference between median interests and 
(regional) social optimum, which is typically caused by skewed distribution of income (cf. Meltzer-Richard’s 
classic model of redistribution). In our setup, to eliminate the difference, it is sufficient to impose that the mean 
type  is  identical  to  the  median  type,  because  social  optimum  can  be  written  as  optimum  of  a  hypothetical 
individual with the mean of preference for public good. Whenever the median is equal to the mean, then this 
hypothetical individual in fact represents the median voter.    4
input  requires  collecting  revenue  p   from  each  individual  in  either  of  the  regions. 
(Throughout the text, all cost variables are normalized per capita.) In decentralization without 
transfers, each region can only pay expenditures for its own input, and the tax per capita is 
i i pg t = .  In  decentralization  with  transfers,  the  tax  per  capita  writes  ( ) i i i t p g s = + .  In 
centralization,  we  assume  equal-cost  sharing  rule  for  any  given  1 x   and  2 x , 
1 2 1 2 ( ) 2 t t x x p = = + . If only this rule holds, and nothing else, then the level of transfers in 
centralization (i.e. the distribution of costs across transfers and payments for own inputs) is 
arbitrary and irrelevant for utility of any citizen. To illustrate the point: Cost sharing,  1 2 t t = , 
implies 2( ) i i i i s s x x − − − = − . There is an infinite amount of possibilities how to determine the 
pair of subsidies,  ( , ) i i s s−  and keep  ( , ) i i x x−  intact, as long as non-negativity constraints are 




2 ( ) , ( ) i i i i i i i i i s s s x x g s x s − − − − − = − − = − .  (1) 
 
Then, as calculated below in (2), the tax  ( ) i i t s−  is independent on  i s− . Therefore, we need not 
to specify how transfers are determined in centralization. 
 
( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))
2 2
i i
i i i i i i i i i i i
x x p
t s p s s g s p s x s x x
−
− − − − − −





Any  individual  of  type 
j λ   from  region  i  has  a  quasi-linear  utility  function  with  the 
complementary aggregation of local public goods, 
 
{ } ( ) min , ,
j j
i i i i i U b x x t λ κ − = −   (3) 
 
where  ( ) b G  is an increasing and concave 
2 C -function, and  (0) 0 b = . Assume that all citizens 
are able to meet any tax obligation. 
The timing is as follows. In Stage 1, both regions independently and simultaneously delegate 
two  purely  policy-seeking  citizen-candidates,  one  each.  The  delegates  are  the  majority-
preferred  types  1 2 , 0, 0,
d d λ λ λ λ     ∈ ×     .  Like  in  Besley  and  Coate  (2003),  the    pair  of 
delegates  ( ) 1 2 ,
d d λ λ  is majority preferred if, in each region a majority of citizens prefer the 
type of their representative to any other type, given the other region’s representative type. 
Later in the text, in order to derive the majority-preferred types, we use that the equilibrium 
pair is identical as if the Stage 1 reduced to a non-cooperative game of two individuals,   5
median voters from the two regions (defined by 
j j m
i i λ λ λ − = = ); this claim will be separately 
proved for decentralization and centralization. Three types of best responses of the median 




i λ λ = ;  the  median  voter  in  region  i  supports  a 
candidate of identical type), conservative delegation  ( )
d m
i i λ λ < , or progressive delegation 
( )
d m
i i λ λ > .  
In Stage 2, we distinguish between decentralization and centralization. For decentralization, 
each delegate chooses the contribution to the domestic input,  i g , and voluntary transfer to the 
other  region,  i s , if allowed. In centralization, the elected policy-makers bargain over the 
amounts of public goods, maximizing the sum of their utilities, 
d d U U 2 1 + . This also implies 
that Oates’ decentralization theorem does not apply here; in centralization, we are not bound 
by the requirement to provide the identical amounts of local outputs. 
 
2.2 Social optimum 
In this section, we will determine the socially optimal amounts of the inputs. We apply the 




i i i V U d
λ
λ =∫  be the sum of utilities of all individuals in region  i. Social optimum is 
then  defined  as  ( ) ( ) 1 2 1 2 1 2 , argmax g g s s V V
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ , , = + .  We  can  immediately  infer  that  with 
transfers, social optimum is not unique in distribution of costs. The first reason is that–like for 
transfers  under  centralization  discussed  in  (1)  and  (2)–the  distribution  of  tax  costs  into 
subsidies and payments for own input is irrelevant for utility of any individual. The second 
reason is that the distribution of total costs  1 2 ( ) p x x +  across individuals is irrelevant for total 
welfare (because of constant marginal utility of private consumption).  
Hence,  only  production  matters,  so  we  can  re-write  the  maximization  program  into 
1 2 ( ) argmax( ) i i x x V V
∗ ∗
− , = +   and  let  i i g x = .  To  identify  the  social  optimum,  we  use  that 
( ) ( ) 1 2 1 2 argmax argmax
m m V V U U + = + . This is because the sum of utilities in either of regions 
writes as  
 
' '
0 0 ( ) () ( ) ( )
j j j j
i i i i i i i i i i i i i V F b x x px d b F d px E b px
λ λ
λ κ λ λ λ λ −   = , , − = ⋅ − = ⋅ −   ∫ ∫ .  (4) 
 
By definition, for the median voter,  ()
m m
i i U b pg λ = ⋅ − . This together with the assumption 
( )
m
i E λ λ =  and  i i g x =  implies 
m
i i V U = . In other words, the social optimum is an argument 
maximizing the following function, 
   6
1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 (min{ }) (min{ }) ( )
m m m m U U b x x b x x p x x λ κ λ κ + = , + , − + .  (5) 
 
We maximize (5) by optimizing under the fixed total costs,  i i x x x− = + . Under this restriction, 
1 i i x x − ∂ ∂ = − . Thereby, we can focus only on the marginal benefits associated with increase 
in  i x  and respective decrease in  i x− : 
 
( )
m m m m m m m m m m
i i i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i i i
d U U U U x U U x U U U U
dx x x x x x x x x x x
− − − − − − −
− − − −
+ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= + + + = − + −




We have three cases,  i i x x κ − ≤ ,  [ ] , i i i x x x κ κ − − ∈ , and  i i x x κ − ≥ . Marginal benefits for each 
case are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Marginal benefits in the social optimum under fixed  x 
  i i x x κ − ≤   [ ] , i i i x x x κ κ − − ∈   i i x x κ − ≥  
m
i i U x ∂ ∂   '( )
m
i b x λ   0   0  
m
i i U x− ∂ ∂   0   '( )
m
i b x λ κ κ −   '( )
m
i b x λ κ κ −  
m
i i U x − ∂ ∂   '( )
m
i b x λ κ κ   '( )
m
i b x λ κ κ   0  
m
i i U x − − ∂ ∂   0   0   '( )
m
i b x λ −  
( )
m m
i i i U U x − ∂ + ∂   [ '( ) '( )]
m
i i b x b x λ κ κ +   [ '( ) '( )]
m
i i b x b x λ κ κ κ − −   [ '( ) '( )]
m
i i b x b x λ κ κ − − − +  
 
The last row in Table 1 indicates that (i) if  i x  is relatively low, the utilitarian criterion yields 
maximum feasible  i x , and (ii) if  i x  is relatively high, it yields minimum feasible  i x . The 
optimum  therefore  lies  in  the  intermediate  part  (involving  corners  from  previous  types), 
where  the  interior  first  order  condition  applies,  1 2 [ '( ) '( )] 0
m b x b x λ κ κ κ − = .  Due  to 
monotonicity  of  '() b ⋅ ,    this  implies  symmetry,  1 2 x x = .  Imposing  symmetry  into  (3),  we 
derive the condition for the social optimum as a maximand of (5), 
 
* ( )
m b x p λ κ κ ′ = .  (7) 
 
3. Decentralization 
3.1 No voluntary transfers 
Besley and Coate (2003) found that if regions provide local public goods with spillovers, and   7
the goods are pure substitutes, decentralization without transfers leads to sincere delegation, 
but also to underprovision. Dur and Roelfsema (2005) distinguish between pure substitution, 
defined as  ( ) ( ) i i i i U b g b g c − = + + , and strategic substitution, defined as  ( ) i i i i U b g g c − = + + , 
where  i c  denotes private good (the difference is whether an increase in one public good 
affects marginal rate of substitution of the other public good with the private good). They 
highlight that if the local public goods are strategic substitutes, decentralization in addition 
leads to conservative delegation. Incentives for underprovision are thus even stronger.  
In this section, we show that for our aggregation, these effects are extremely sensitive to the 
assumption of zero voluntary transfers. The complementary technology is extremely helpful 
to capture this point: without transfers, decentralization yields extreme underprovision; with 
transfers, it may even secure the social optimum. It is exactly complementary aggregation that 
reveals that the realistic possibility of voluntary transfers strikingly modifies results in non-
cooperative models of public good provision. 
 
Proposition  1  In  decentralization  without  transfers,  for  any  two  delegates 
1 2 , 0, 0,
d d λ λ λ λ     ∈ ×     , zero provision 1 2 0 g g = =  is a unique Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proof   If  i i g g κ − > , a policy maker  1,2 i∈  can reduce  i g  (less  costs) and at the same time 
keep  min( , ) i i i i G g g g κ κ − − = =  unchanged (constant benefits). This strictly increases utility 
d
i U ,  so  ( ) i i i g g g κ − − >   cannot  be  the  best  response,  and  the  best  response  has  to  satisfy 
( ) i i i g g g κ − − ≤ . For  1 κ < , this condition applied simultaneously to delegate 1 and delegate 2 
( 1 2 g g κ ≤  and  2 1 g g κ ≤ ) is satisfied only as long as  1 2 0 g g = = .              
 
The proposition is driven by the fact that for  1 κ < , the best responses of delegates intersect in 
zero, regardless of the delegates’ preferences for the public good. As a result, voters have no 
incentive to behave strategically, and the possibility to vote strategically in Stage 1 brings no 
change to this extreme outcome.  
 
3.2 Voluntary transfers 
The opportunity to compensate another, less interested region has been highlighted by Vicary 
(1990) and for complementary aggregation studied by Sandler and Vicary (2001), Vicary and 
Sandler (2002), and experimentally by Lei et al. (2007). We will see that the extension of a 
strategy  set  by  voluntary  transfers  may  restore  the  social  optimum,  and  this  efficient 
equilibrium will moreover be immune to the strategic delegation. 
First of all, we will examine incentives in the subgame of delegates (Stage 2). In the very 
beginning, consider that the necessary condition for the best response (and henceforth for a   8
Nash equilibrium) to exist is that each delegate minimizes costs for the fixed amount of the 
local output (no-waste property). We use this rather trivial property of the equilibrium in the 
proof of the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1 In decentralization with transfers, in Nash equilibrium of the subgame of delegates, 
at least one of the regions contributes nothing to its own input,  1,2: 0 i i g ∃ ∈ = . 
 
Proof   We partition the set of strategy profiles in the following subsets: (a)  1 2 0 s s = = , (b) 
1 2 0, 0 s s > = , (c)  1 2 0, 0 s s = > , and (d)  1 2 0, 0 s s > > . Incentives for deviation in subset (a) 
have been examined in Proposition 1, although on a restricted strategy set. From there, the 
only candidate for equilibrium in subset (a) is  1 2 0 g g = = . 
In subset (b), the delegate 1 contributes to both inputs, and cannot tolerate waste in either of 
them. The reason is that a strictly positive subsidy  1 0 s >  implies a strictly positive  1 0 g > , 
and  no-waste  property  gives  1 1 2 1 ( ) G g g s κ = = + .  Output  in  region  2  is 
2 2 1 1 min( , ) G g s g κ = + . If region 2 provides  2 0 g > , then  2 1 1 g s g κ + ≤  (otherwise no-waste 
property is violated). However, we know  1 2 1 1 1 G g s g g κ κ = + = > . Thus,  2 0 g = . In subset 
(c), an equilibrium is symmetric to the equilibrium in subset (b),  1 0 g = . 
In subset (d), suppose first  1 0 g >  and  2 0 g > . Then, no-waste properties for both delegates 
dictate  1 1 2 2 1 ( ) G g s g s κ = + = +   and  symmetrically  2 2 1 1 2 ( ) G g s g s κ = + = + .  This  implies 
2 1 κ = , which is false. Therefore, any equilibrium profile must be either in subset (a), (b) or 
(c). And in these subsets, there exists i, such that  0 i g = .                
 
Lemma 1 suggests that in the equilibrium, at least one of the delegates reneges on providing 
domestic input, and rather cross-subsidizes the foreign input. The point is hidden is in the 
combination of complementarity and imperfect access to the foreign input: any delegate who 
contributes to own input in fact needs strictly more (at least 1 κ -times) inputs to be located in 
the other region. This obviously cannot hold for both regions at the same time.  
To simplify search for equilibrium, we introduce two extra terms: for any delegate i, let S-
strategy be any strategy for which  0 i g = , and T-strategy be any strategy for which  0 i g > . 
Strategy profiles can be, using this notation and ordering  1 2 ( , ) g g , classified into SS, ST, TS, 
or TT. By Lemma 1, TT is never in equilibrium. Next, notice that ST implies  2 0 s >  (and TS 
implies  1 0 s > ).  The  proof  is  simple:  If  not  and  2 0 s = ,  then 
{ } { } 1 2 1 2 2 1 min 0, ( ) min , 0 0 G g s G g s κ κ = + = = + = , which violates the no-waste property at 
least for the delegate 2 (a decrease in  2 g  will  not affect  2 G  and at the same time will   9
decrease costs). 
To summarize: T-strategy in equilibrium is always characterized by  0 i g >  and  0 i s > , while 
for S-strategy, we have  0 i g =  and  0 i s ≥ . T-strategy thus can be re-interpreted as a strict two-
input strategy (paying both own and foreign input), whereas S-strategy is a weak single-input 
strategy (paying only the foreign input, if anything). 
The useful properties of quasi-linear preferences are that without additional restrictions, the 
marginal utility of public consumption is independent on the amount of private consumption, 
and the marginal utility of private consumption is constant. Therefore, we can define an 
interior optimal amount of output for each strategy type (S or T), denoted as  ( )
S G λ  and 
( )
T G λ . The former is the optimal amount of the local output if any additional output requires 
paying only extra foreign input, and the latter is the optimal amount of the local output if any 
additional output requires paying both inputs. (Interior optimum means that if a delegate  i 
uses  S-strategy,  she  is  not  bound  by  the  insufficient  amount  of  i s− ;  we  can  write 
min( , ( )) ( ) i i i i i i G s s g s g κ κ − − − = + = + .)  
Specifically, let  ( )
S d
i i G λ  be the optimal amount of the local output that the delegate i prefers 
to be provided if any additional output requires from her paying only extra foreign input, and 
let  ( )
d
i S λ   be  the  total  amount  of  the  foreign  inputs  corresponding  to  ( )
S d
i i G λ ,  hence 
( ) ( )
S d d
i i i G S λ κ λ = . Then, for any 
d
i λ  we have 
 
( ) argmax ( ) argmax ( )
S d d d i
i i i i i i i i
pG
G b G ps b G pg λ λ λ
κ




i i i b G p λ κ λ = .  (9) 
 
Let  ( )
T d
i i G λ   be  the  optimal  amount  of  the  local  output  preferred  by  delegate  i  if  any 
additional output requires from her paying both domestic and foreign input, and let  ( )
d
i T λ  be 
the total amount of the foreign inputs corresponding to  ( )
T d
i i G λ , hence  ( ) ( )
T d d
i i i G T λ κ λ = . We 
use that for interior optimum in T-strategy,  i i i i G s g s κ − = = + : 
 
(1 )
( ) argmax ( ) ( ) argmax ( )
T d d d i
i i i i i i i i i
pG






= − + = − + , 
(10) 
'( ( )) (1 )
d T d
i i i b G p λ κ λ κ = + .  (11) 
 
Notice that the marginal price per extra output is 1 κ + -times higher, hence  ( ) ( )
d d
i i T S λ λ < . 
Also, because of symmetry of the optimization problem,  1 2
d d λ λ =  implies  1 2 ( ) ( )
d d S S λ λ =  and   10
1 2 ( ) ( )
d d T T λ λ = . What is particularly important is that the values of these interior optimal 
outputs are not affected by the strategy of the other delegate, ( , ) i i g s − − ; later we will see that 
the other delegate only affects whether the optimum is available or not. 
Finally, by comparing (7), (9) and (11), notice that  ( )
m S λ  is also the socially-optimal amount 
of inputs, 
* ( )
m x S λ = . This means that if both median-type candidates  1 2 ( )
d d m λ λ λ = =  expect 
SS-profile, each of them selects  1 2 ( )
m s s S λ = = , which yields the socially optimal allocation. 
Here,  complementarity  is  never  binding,  since  i i s s κ − ≤ ,  and  min( , ) i i i i G s s s κ κ − = = . 
Proposition 2 formally proves that such candidates indeed expect SS-profile, not ST or TS, 
and therefore coordinate on the social optimum. 
 
Proposition  2  In  decentralization  with  transfers,  in  the  subgame  of  delegates,  where 
1 2
d d m λ λ λ = = ,  a  unique  subgame-perfect  Nash  equilibrium  is  1 2 ( )
m s s S λ = =   and 
1 2 0 g g = = . 
 
Proof   Using Lemma 1, impose without loss of generality  1 0 g = . First, examine the best 
response of delegate 2  2 2 ( , ) g s  as a function of the expected  1
e s . To get this best response, we 
use that only two strategy profiles, ST and SS, can be in equilibrium (TT is impossible by 
Lemma 1, and TS violates  1 0 g = ). Therefore, we can find an optimal response of delegate 2 
limited to the set of ST profiles and an optimal response limited to the set of SS profiles; by 
comparing utility for each of the optimal responses, we get the genuine best response. 
If  1
e s  is large enough,  1 2 ( )
e d s S κ λ ≥ , an optimal S-strategy of delegate 2 involves  2 2
S G G = , 
2 2 ( )
d s S λ =  and  2 0 g = ; if  1 2 ( )
e d s S κ λ < , an optimal S-strategy of delegate 2 involves  2 1
e G s = , 
2 1
e s s κ =  and  2 0 g = . Similarly, an optimal T-strategy of delegate 2 must give  2 2 ( )
T m G G λ = , 
2 2 ( )
d s T λ =   and  { } 2 2 1 max 0, ( )
d e g T s κ λ = − .  Figure  1  depicts  utilities  of  delegate  2 
corresponding to each of these optimal responses (S-strategy giving SS-profile and T-strategy 
giving ST-profile),  2 1 ( )
SS e U s  and  2 1 ( )
ST e U s . 
Due to concavity of  ( ) b ⋅ , there is a critical level of the expected  1
e s , denoted as  1
C s : if  1 1
e C s s < , 
then the delegate 2 chooses the expensive, two-input T-strategy (and profile ST); otherwise 
she  chooses  the  cheaper,  single-input  S-strategy  (and  profile  SS).  (For  the  sake  of 
completeness, the tie-breaking rule is in favor of SS; its precise specification does not affect 
the results.) Evidently from Fig. 1,  1 0 ( )
C m s T κ λ < < .  
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Fig. 1. Utility of the median-type delegate 2 under optimal SS- and ST-responses to  1
e s , 
2 1 ( )
SS e U s  and  2 1 ( )
ST e U s  
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The next condition necessary to hold in equilibrium is  1 1
e s s = , i.e. the  equilibrium beliefs are 
correct. In other words, the best response of the delegate 1 to  2 1 ( )
e g s  and  2 1 ( )
e s s  must be 
1 1
e s s =  and  1 0 g = . Thereby we check for the mutual best responses of the delegate 1 and the 
delegate 2. 
ST profile. If the delegate 2 uses T-strategy, then  2 2 ( )
T m G G λ =  always holds. Notice from 
Fig. 1 that  1 ( )
C m s T κ λ < , hence in ST-profile, we have  1 1 ( )
e C m s s T κ λ ≤ < . This gives us a full 
specification of the best response of the delegate 2 for any  1 1
e C s s ≤ , namely  2 ( )
m s T λ =  and 
2 1 ( ) 0
m e g T s κ λ = − ≥ .  
On this interval,  { } { } 1 2 2 1 1 1 min , ( ) min ( ), ( ( ) )
m m e G s g s T T s s κ λ κ κ λ = + = − + . This allows to 
derive the best response of the delegate 1, namely the optimal  1 1 2 2 ( , ) s s s g = . We have to 
realize that the delegate 1 considers both S-strategy and T-strategy.  
i.  For T-strategy, the interior optimum  1 1 ( ) ( )
T m m G G T λ κ λ = =  gives  1 0 g = , since the 
other input is provided in a sufficient amount,  2 ( ) ( )
m m s T T λ κ λ = > , exceeding the   12
optimum  1 ( )
m x T κ λ =  under T-strategy. This implies that the delegate 1 responds only 
by S-strategy. 
ii.  For S-strategy, we have to distinguish between two cases: 
a)  ( ) ( )
m m T S λ κ λ < :  The  delegate  1  gets  1 1 ( ) ( )
S m m G G S λ κ λ < = ,  because 
complementarity  is  binding  in  the  amount  of  input  1, 
1 2 ( ) ( )
m m x s T S λ κ λ = = < . Her best response is therefore to match the amount 
of  input  1,  2 1 2 1 1 ( ) ( )
m g s x G x T κ κ λ + = = = = ,  from  which  we  derive 
2
1 2 1 ( ) ( )(1 )
m m e s T g T s λ κ λ κ κ = − = − + . Since 
2 (1 ) 0 κ κ − > , the delegate 1 
sets  1 1
e s s >  (deviates from expectations of the delegate 2), so for this case, the 
equilibrium cannot be in ST-profile. 
b)  ( ) ( )
m m S T κ λ λ ≤ :  Complementarity  is  not  binding,  and 
1 1 ( ) ( )
S m m G G S λ κ λ = = .  The  best  response  of  the  delegate  1  satisfies 
1 2 1 ( ) ( ) ( )
m m m e s S g S T s λ λ κ λ = − = − + .  Since  ( ) ( ) ( )
m m m S T T λ λ κ λ > > ,  we 
have  1 1
e s s > . This again implies that the delegate 1 deviates from expectations 
of the delegate 2, and the condition  1 1
e s s =  cannot be satisfied. Also for this 
case, no ST-profile is a Nash equilibrium. 
iii.  In total, Nash equilibrium cannot occur for any ST-profile under any condition. 
SS profile. The delegate 2 uses S-strategy, where  2 1 2 min( , )
e G s s κ = . She aims at the interior 
equilibrium  2 2 ( )
S m G G λ = , but can be constrained by unavailability of the other input (too low 
1
e s , namely  2 1 ( )
e m x s S κ λ = < .  Therefore,  for  1 ( )
e m s S κ λ ≥ ,  we have the interior optimum 
2 ( )
m s S λ = ; otherwise  2 1
e s s κ = .  
What is the best response  1 s , considering  2 2 1 ( )
e s s s = ? We have  1 2 1 min( , ) G s s κ = . Like the 
delegate 2, also the delegate 1 wants in the interior optimum  1 1( )
m G G λ =  and  1 ( )
m s S λ = ; 
this  is  limited  by  complementarity  in  the  production  of  1 G   as  long  as    2 ( )
m s S κ λ < .  
However,  can  this  complementarity  be  binding  in  equilibrium,  where  1 1
e s s = ?  No.  First, 
suppose  that  both  complementarities  bind,  i.e.  2 1 s s κ =   and  1 2 s s κ = .  This  obviously 
implies a false statement, 
2 1 κ = . Second, if only the latter complementarity binds, we have 
2 ( )
m s S κ λ <  (the delegate 1 is bound) and  2 ( )
m s S λ =  (the delegate 2 is not bound), which is 
obviously  inconsistent  with  each  other.  Therefore,  the  delegate  1  is  never  bound  and 
1 ( )
m s S λ = .  The  delegate  2  responds  to  1 ( ) ( ) ( )
m m m s S S T λ κ λ κ λ = > >   by  selecting  S-
strategy, and since  1 ( ) ( )
m m s S S λ κ λ = > , the delegate 2 is not bound, and sets  2 ( )
m s S λ = .    
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The  mechanics  of  the  proof  has  illustrated  crucial  properties  of  the  equilibrium  in  the 
subgame of delegates. We found that the possibility of compensations makes median-type 
delegates install the social optimum, even in the purely non-cooperative mode. Nevertheless, 
we still do not know if the socially optimal allocation is immune to the possibility of strategic 
delegation. This is addressed by Proposition 3, whereby we deliver the core result of this 
section. 
 
Proposition  3  In  decentralization  with  voluntary  transfers,  delegation  of  median-type 
representatives,  1 2
d d m λ λ λ = = , who employ inputs at socially optimal levels, 
*
1 2 x x x = = , is a 
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium if 
 
( ) ( )
2 ( ) ( ) ( )
m m m m m b T b S pS λ κ λ λ κ λ λ < − .  (12) 
 
Proof As in decentralization, we solve the Stage 1 as if the median voters were regional 
dictators. Then we will prove that the resulting delegates are Condorcet winners in elections 
in  each  region.  We  analyse  stability  of  the  symmetric  median-type  delegation.  When 
considering deviation, the median voter in region 1 expects that only SS, ST, or TS profiles 
can emerge in the subgame of delegates. If SS-profile occurs, any strategic delegation that 
would involve  1 ( )
m s S λ ≠  would be obviously dominated by  1 ( )
m s S λ =  (recall definition of 
( )
S m G λ ).  Also  if  TS-profile  occurs,  the  median  voter  would  lose  comparing  to  social 
optimum, because her delegate would have to employ a more expensive technology (for any 
level of output). Thus, the only incentive for strategic delegation is to induce an ST-profile, 
and free ride on the region 2 whose median-type delegate resorts to an expensive two-input 
strategy. 
To keep ST profile in an equilibrium of the subgame of delegates, where  1 1
e s s = , the delegate 
1 must prefer a credibly low  1 1 1 1 ( )
e d C s s S s λ = = < , hence must be sufficiently uninterested in 
public goods. The existence of ST-profile is thus conditional on median voter 1 nominating a 
sufficiently  conservative  (low  λ -type)  delegate.  In  ST-profile,  we  know  that  the  best 
response of delegate 2 is  2 ( )
m s T λ =  and  2 1 ( )
m e g T s κ λ = − . This implies that for the best 
response of the delegate 2 to be in ST-profile (where  2 0 g > ), we have to have  1 ( )
e m s T κ λ < . 
Now, for what kind of delegate 1 is a strictly positive  1 1 0 ( )
e m s s T κ λ < = <  her best response? 
First,  recall  that  we  always  have  { }
2
1 1 1 min ( ), ( ( ) ) ( )
m m e m G T T s s T λ κ κ λ κ λ = − + = .  Any 
delegate who has no incentive to decrease the strictly positive  1 0 s >  below expectations and 
thereby decrease  1 G  below 
2
1 ( )
m G T κ λ =  must satisfy  1 ( ) ( )
d m S T λ κ λ ≥ . Any delegate who 
has no incentive to increase  1 s  and thereby increase  1 G  (under non-binding complementarity   14
2 ( ) ( )
m m T T κ λ λ < ) must satisfy  1 ( ) ( )
d m S T λ κ λ ≤ . This gives that only one specific type of the 
delegate, for whom  1 ( ) ( )
d m S T λ κ λ = , produces in equilibrium  1 1 0 ( )
e m s s T κ λ < = < .  
For  any  1
d λ   such  that  1 ( ) ( )
d m S T λ κ λ < ,  the  best  response  of  the  delegate  1  satisfies 
2 1 1 ( ) ( )
d g s S κ κ λ + = , hence  1 1 2 1 1 1 ( ) ( ) ( )
d d m e e s S g S T s s λ λ κ λ = − = − + < . Only corner solution 
applies,  1 1 0
e s s = = . Recall also that any conservative delegate for whom  1 ( ) ( )




m G T κ λ =  in the subgame of delegates. Clearly, since this amount of 
output  1 G  is independent on  1 s , the median voter 1 chooses some of the more conservative 
delegates,  defined  by  1 ( ) ( )
d m S T λ κ λ <   who  sets  1 0 s = ;  although  delegating  a  candidate 
defined by  1 ( ) ( )
d m S T λ κ λ =  would bring identical output, there would be an infinite number 
of multiple equilibria in the subgame of delegates (Stage 2), characterized by  1 [0, ( )]
m s T κ λ ∈  
and  2 1 ( )
m g T s κ λ = − ; with exception of  1 0 s = , all are from the perspective of the median 
voter  1  inferior  to  delegating  1 ( ) ( )
d m S T λ κ λ < ,  and  obtaining  1 0 s =   with  certainty.  To 
conclude this part, the median voter 1–if invokes an ST-profile–delegates in such a way that 
the local output is 
2
1 ( )
m G T κ λ =  and her costs are zero  1 ( 0) s = . Her utility from the profile is 
2
1 ( ( ))
m m m U b T λ κ λ = . 
Condition (12) then imposes that if the median voter 1 nominates in this conservative way and 
free rides on the other region, her utility from invoking the best of ST-profiles is still less than 
the  utility  from  the  social  optimum,  involving  the  symmetric  SS-profile.  Since  no  other 
profile can give any better outcome, this condition is sufficiently strong to deter the median 
voter 1 from anything but sincere delegation.  
Finally, we prove that  1
d m λ λ =  is a Condorcet winner in electoral Stage 1. Let  1 1 ( )
d j λ λ  be the 
optimal delegate for voter  j  of type  1
j λ ; this is the delegate who induces  2 1 1 ( )
j x s S λ = =  in 
SS-profile. First,  1 ( )
j S λ  as the optimal  1 s  (and optimal  2 x ) is increasing in  1
j λ . Second, the 
preferences of any voter over  1 s  (or  2 x ) under SS-profile are single-peaked. Third, by (9) and 
( ) ( )
S S G λ λ κ = , in order to increase  ( ) S λ , a more progressive delegate has to be elected 
(monotonic transformation). Together,  1 1 ( )
d j λ λ  is increasing in  1
j λ  and preferences of voters 
over types  1
d λ  are single-peaked, which is a sufficient condition for the median voter theorem 
to hold.                               
 
Put in brief, condition (12) is for unwillingness of the median voter 1 to impose even the most 
favorable ST profile. If it holds, ST profile cannot be in equilibrium, and SS profile is the only 
equilibrium profile. With this, it is easy to conclude that none of median voters deviates from 
d m
i λ λ = , since none of them wants her delegate to deviate from  1 2 ( )
m s s S λ = = .   15
3.3 Example 
The condition (12) may hold in entire parameter space  (0,1) (0, ) (0, )
m p κ λ × × ∈ × ∞ × ∞ . This 
is the case of  ( ) 2 b G G = , where the condition (12) reduces to 
2 ( 1) 0 κ − > , which is true. 
For other functions, validity of the condition may be restricted to a parameter subspace. This 
is  illustrated  on  Fig.  2  with  the  functions  ( ) ln( 1) b G G = +   and  ( ) ( 1) b G G G = + ,  both 
satisfying requirements of monotonicity, concavity, and  (0) 0 b = . In space of 
m p κ λ × , the 
figure captures when (12) is satisfied for each of the two functions. It can be shown that all 
values  to  the  left  from  the  respective  curves  satisfy  the  condition.  From  the  location  of 
parameters  ( , )
m p κ λ  which violate (12), we can conjecture–at least for this two particular 
functions–that the efficient equilibrium is more likely with 
(i)  the worse access to the foreign complement (lower κ ),  
(ii)  the lower median interest in public goods (lower 
m λ ), and  
(iii)  the higher price  p . 
 
Fig. 2. Condition (12) for  ( ) ln( 1) b G G = +  and  ( ) ( 1) b G G G = +  

















Eq. (12) holds 
for b=G/(1+G) 
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4. Cooperative centralization 
If decentralization can deliver the social optimum, why not cooperative centralization, where 
cost  shares  are  equalized  and  delegates  have  access  to  perfect  commitment/cooperation 
devices? With sincere delegation, joint bargaining of the two median-type politicians would 
indeed  deliver  the  social  optimum.  Rational  voters  nevertheless  tend  to  elect  different 
delegates. This stems from dichotomy in devices available in each stage: in electoral stage, 
voters in one region play non-cooperatively with voters from the other region; in policy-
making stage, the delegates play cooperatively among each other (bargain). Non-cooperative 
voters may welcome surplus from bargaining, but also try to improve their odds by effectively 
delegating  a  delegate  with  specific  preferences.  We  find  that  the  strategic  delegation  in 
centralization implies an unambiguous welfare loss in comparison with the social optimum. 
First, consider that the objective function of the two policy-makers who bargain over the 
provision of local inputs is 
 
1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 (min( )) (min( )) ( )
d d d d U U b x x b x x p x x λ κ λ κ + = , + , − + .  (13) 
 
In analysing the optimum, we are firstly interested in the relative size of  1 x  to  2 x . Therefore, 
suppose for the moment fixed total revenues (hence also fixed total spending), and derive the 
optimal  1( ) x x   under  1 2 x x x + = .  We  have  three  intervals,  1 2 x x κ ≤ ,  1 2 2 [ , ] x x x κ κ ∈ ,  and 
1 2 x x κ ≥ ,  alternatively  written  as  1 (1 ) x xκ κ ≤ + ,  1 [ (1 ), (1 )] x x x κ κ κ ∈ + + ,  and 
1 (1 ) x x κ ≥ + . Marginal benefits associated with an increase in  1 x  and a respective decrease 
in  2 x  are shown in Table 2, created analogically to Table 1, where for all intervals 
 
1 2 1 1 2 2
1 1 2 1 2
( )
d d d d d d d U U U U U U
dx x x x x
+ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= − + −




Table 2 Marginal benefits in the bargaining outcome under fixed  x 
  1 2 x x κ ≤   [ ] 1 2 2 , x x x κ κ ∈   1 2 x x κ ≥  
1 1
d U x ∂ ∂   1 1 '( )
db x λ   0   0  
1 2
d U x ∂ ∂   0   1 2 '( )
d b x λ κ κ   1 2 '( )
d b x λ κ κ  
2 1
d U x ∂ ∂   2 1 '( )
d b x λ κ   2 1 '( )
d b x λ κ   0  
2 2
d U x ∂ ∂   0   0   2 2 '( )
db x λ  
1 2 1 ( )
d d U U x ∂ + ∂   1 1 2 1 '( ) '( )
d d b x b x λ λ κ κ +   2 1 1 2 '( ) '( )
d d b x b x λ κ κ λ κ κ −   2 2 1 2 '( ) '( )
d d b x b x λ λ κ κ − −  
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From  Table  2  we deduce (like when  identifying  the  social  optimum) that  the bargaining 
outcome must be in the middle interval for any  1
d λ  and  2
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′
< < =
+ + ′ −
   otherwise. 
(15) 
 
Notice that the bargaining result is unique, since  1 2
d d U U + , subject to constant  x, is strictly 




2 1 1 1 2
1
( )
''( ) ''( ) 0
d d
d d d U U
b x b x x
d x
λ κ λ κ
+
= + − < . 
(16) 
 
Importantly, notice that if the solution is interior (of the third type), we can derive any i x  in 
the following implicit form as a function  ( )
d




i i b x p λ κ κ − =   (17) 
 
After this introductory part, we can proceed to the main result. We again use that median 
voters  are  decisive  in  their  regions.  We  will  focus  on  their  best  responses  in  the  non-
cooperative game in Stage 1 where the strategy is a type of the delegate. Finally we check that 
the delegates are Condorcet winners in regional elections. 
Since we are only interested in stability of the socially optimal allocation, and this allocation 
can  be  achieved  only  via  median-type  delegates  (obviously  from  (7)  and  (17)),  this  task 
reduces  to  discerning  whether  median-type  delegates  occur  in  equilibrium.  Proposition  3 
rejects  this  possibility;  if  a  median  voter  expects  a  median-type  delegate  from  the  other 
region, she has an incentive to vote for a progressive delegate. 
 
Proposition 4 In cooperative centralization, median-type delegates  1 2
d d m λ λ λ = =  cannot be 
simultaneously present in the Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proof   If median-type delegates are in place, then the median voter 1 considers delegating 
other than the median-type delegate. The bargaining result for sufficiently close delegates   18
gives  1 2 G x κ = ,  so  on  the  neighborhood  of  1 ( , )
d m m λ λ ε λ ε ∈ − + ,  the  median  voter  1 
maximizes  1 1 2 1 2 ( ) ( ) 2
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d d
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Plugging (19) into (18), we recognize that for  1
d λ  in order to be in interior optimum, we need 
that  2 x   satisfies  1 2 ( ) 2
m b x p λ κ κ ′ = .  By  inspection  of  (15),  this  holds  exactly  when 
1 2
d m m λ λ λ = > .  From  the  perspective  of  the  median  voter  1,  delegating  a  progressive 
candidate dominates delegating a median-type candidate, hence median-type delegates are not 
the  mutual best responses and cannot both occur in equilibrium if the median voters are 
decisive.  
Finally, we prove that  1 2
d m m λ λ λ = >  is a Condorcet winner in electoral Stage 1. Let  1 1 ( )
d j λ λ  
be  the  optimal  delegate  for  voter  j   of  type  1
j λ ;  this  is  the  delegate  who  satisfies 
1 2 ( ) 2
j b x p λ κ κ ′ = . First, the optimal  2 x  is increasing in  1
j λ . Second, the preferences of any 
voter  j  over  2 x  are single-peaked. Third, by (17), in order to increase  2 x , a more progressive 
delegate has to be elected. Together,  1 1 ( )
d j λ λ  is increasing in  1
j λ  and preferences of voters 
over types  1
d λ  are single-peaked, which is a sufficient condition for the median voter theorem 
to hold.                           
 
The concluding proposition combines results from Proposition 3 and 4. 
 
Proposition  5  If  (12)  holds,  then  cooperative  centralization  is  Pareto-inferior  to  non-
cooperative decentralization with transfers. 
 
Proof   First, we prove that the social optimum in cooperative centralization needs median-
type delegates: social optimum is symmetric, 
*
1 2 x x x = = , so it must be the third type of 
solution  in  (15).  This  type  of  solution  must  satisfy  (17).  Comparing  (17)  and  (7),  and 
considering monotonicity of  ( ) b ⋅ , this means that 
d m
i λ λ =  in order to 
*
i x x = . 
Second,  by  Proposition  4,  median-type  delegates  are  not  in  equilibrium  of  cooperative   19
centralization,  hence  cooperative  centralization  yields  allocation  that  doesn’t  maximize 
welfare. Third, by Proposition 3, under condition (12) decentralization with transfers achieves 
the social optimum, hence welfare is greater than in cooperative centralization.          
 
5. Imperfect complementarity 
In the introduction, we have considered a case where complementarity is due to strategic 
choice of an adversary. We can think of at least three other possibilities. 
Consumption  complementarity.  Extremely  high  (ideally  infinitely  large)  marginal  rate  of 
substitution may be realistic for extreme scarcity of subsistence goods, e.g. sleep, water, or 
security. (Lei et al. (2007) discuss poverty to be a weakest-link public good.) Drawing partial 
inspiration from William Styron’s Sophie’s choice, consider a drastic but instructive case of a 
family with a large number of children subject to famine and genocide. Then, a child survives 
only if supplied with the subsistence amount of food as well as the subsistence amount of 
security, and the number of children survived is given by a complementary function. 
An  example  of  imperfect  consumption  complementarity  follows:  Suppose  two  extremely 
poor, neighboring regions. Region W has access to river and thereby disposes with water 
reservoirs in volume  w; Region R has a road network to the port, with density  r . Region R 
can  use  only  water  from  wells,  where  the  level  is  determined  by  the  level  in  the  water 
reservoirs in region W; water consumption is  w κ , where realistically  1 κ < . Water decays if 
transported across borders. Region W earns foreign exchange only by using roads in region R; 
sales write  r κ . It may be that water consumption and foreign exchange are complementary, 
especially if the money is used mainly to purchase medicine against epidemics or necessities 
for living. Then, utilities write  min( , )
W U w r κ =  and  min( , )
R U r w κ = . 
Piece-to-piece  complementarity.  Instead  of  local  goods,  we  can  think  of  inputs  that  are 
technologically predetermined to be pieces into a compound good. Imperfection may reflect 
that a norm prescribes access to certain amount of one of the inputs. Non-rivalry can be 
explained by time structure of the provision of inputs; the rival inputs are used in different, 
mutually exclusive time spans. 
As an example of imperfect piece-to-piece complementarity, consider an organization with a 
technical  unit and  personal unit, T and P. The technical unit has  t supercomputers,  and 
personal unit has  p  experts. The management prescribes that each unit devotes ρ  of working 
hours to the needs of the other unit (1 ρ −  remains). To process certain tasks, the personal unit 
needs supercomputers, whereas the technical unit needs to sit the experts to the computers. 
One task is done if exactly one expert works for one working hour on a supercomputer (notice 
that we do not need that working time of each expert is identical or that working time of each 
computer  is  the  same).  Then,  if  we  let  (1 ) κ ρ ρ = − ,  the  outputs  write 
(1 )min( , )
P Y p t ρ κ = − , and  (1 )min( , )
P Y t p ρ κ = − .   20
Norm-imposed complementarity. Even when inputs are effective substitutes, regulation can 
impose a fixed ratio, hence establishes artificial complementarity. Consider an example of a 
university consisting of two parts, a research center C and a teaching department D. The 
center hires r  experienced researchers with the status of professors, and the department hires 
l  lecturers.  The  research  center  pays  researchers  and  department  pays  lecturers,  but  the 
university has a (more or less formal) rule that any employee must be available for the other 
part of the organization, at working capacity  1 κ < .  
If either C or D wants to establish a program, they need both professors’ working time and 
lecturers’ working time. The required capacities are given by the government administration 
(at  least  in  the  Czech  Republic).  If  normalized  to  one,  the  number  of  programs  is 
min( , )
C Y r l κ =  and  min( , )
D Y l r κ = . 
To summarize: Imperfect complementarity can be traced in the production of governments, 
organizations and perhaps also in teams. Any interpretation of this very special aggregation 
has to address four issues: 
i.  Complementarity.  What  makes  production  or  consumption  complementary?  We 
recognized either strategic choice of an adversary (terrorists), an extreme marginal 
rate of substitution for subsistence (water and medicine), combination of physical 
and human capital (supercomputer and expert), or regulation (minimal number of 
professors and lecturers). 
ii.  Imperfection. Why does an input/good from the other region enter imperfectly? We 
have suggested the importance of local knowledge (antiterrorist measures), spatial 
characteristics (spillovers), or regulation (organizational directives). 
iii.  Immobility.  What  makes  production  locally  specific?  There  can  be  spatial 
characteristic  (borders,  or  rivers),  or  an  exogenously  predetermined  allocation  of 
competencies (organizational rules). 
iv.  Non-rivalry  and  non-exclusion.  Why  is  an  input  or  good  of  one  region  or  one 
organization unit available to the others, and for free? This was by mobility of an 




In  this  paper,  we  have  examined  decentralization  and  centralization  of  the  provision  of 
imperfect complements, in the case of two fully symmetric regions. We have extended Besley 
and Coate (2003) in two respects: (i) complements, not substitutes were investigated; (ii) 
voluntary transfers from one region to another were permitted. Like the previous literature (cf. 
Dur  and Roelfsema, 2005), we find  that cooperative centralization  with uniform taxation 
induces progressive delegation; voters tend to delegate politicians who are very much in favor   21
of public-good provision.  
We  stress  two  novel  findings:  the  possibility  of  transfers  allows  non-cooperative 
decentralization to reach even the first-best allocation (social optimum), immune to strategic 
delegation, whereas cooperative centralization always implies deviation from the first best. 
Hence, cooperative centralization of imperfect complements is never the first best, and may 
not even be the second best. Also, the tradeoffs associated with centralization need not to 
exist at all. 
Albeit  the  scope  of  complementary  aggregation  is  limited,  it  is  useful  to  find  out  this 
straightforward  result  in  a  strategically  rich  and  realistic  setting  where  both  voluntary 
transfers and strategic delegation are taken into account.   22
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